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Summary 
 
In this paper, BISS experts address the issue Belarus’ temporary withdrawal from the EU’s 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). This decision was initially seen as a tool to influence the 
attitude of the Belarusian authorities towards independent trade unions. However, the GSP as a 
policy tool was not sufficient to change the status quo. Therefore, new routes of influence have to 
be discovered. 
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1. The road to GSP suspension 
 
On June 21, 2007, the EU has temporarily deprived Belarus of its trade preferences provided 
within the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Although some EU 
countries considered this decision to be short-sighted, the EU, as the EU Trade Commissioner, 
Peter Mandelson stressed, employed it to create ‘real’ incentives for democratization of Belarus. If 
so, has this policy tool demonstrated any efficiency so far? What is at stake here – both for the 
Belarusian authorities and the EU? This paper assesses the current situation and suggests that the 
use of GSP suspension is a weak policy tool. Also, some policy recommendations are devised for 
the EU to revise its current stance towards Belarus. 
 
The story starts from 2000, when a number of trade unions lodged a complaint to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) about violation of their rights. In general, a hostile attitude 
to the independent trade unions has been a by-product of more overarching goals that the 
Belarusian authorities pursued. The first such goal is of the political nature, namely, the 
establishment of a comprehensive control over the political arena (manifested in the construction 
of so-called ‘vertical of authority’), and over the Belarusian society including grassroots 
movements and the trade unions. The second goal is somewhere at the backcloth, but still 
important. Independent trade unions can make attempts to bargain independently over wages and 
thus cause wage drift, resulting in the wage inflation and macroeconomic imbalances. Ultimately, 
the independent trade union activism could potentially derail the political business cycles run by 
the Belarusian authorities.  
 
In the face of the discrimination by the government, trade union leaders complained to the ILO 
about the violation of trade union rights in Belarus. This UN agency had attempted to help 
independent unions inside Belarus, and began to monitor the situation with essential labor rights in 
Belarus. Their further violation informed the establishment of a special Commission of Inquiry to 
perform fieldwork in Belarus. The Commission confirmed that no progress has been made by 
Belarus, and included Belarus into the ‘Special Paragraph’ (the ILO “hall of shame”) together with 
other undemocratic regimes. Some warned about the possibility of Belarus’ exclusion from the 
ILO, but no practical guidance has been provided on how to apply that in the relation to the one 
of the founding members of the United Nations. Instead, the focus of the affair has been on the 
need to fulfill twelve recommendations made by the ILO to recover the relationships.  (see Table 
1) 
 
It is not only the ILO, bit the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), and World Confederation of Labor (WCL) that 
have monitored the situation in Belarus and rigorously campaigned for freedom of association and 
the right to organize. Since June 2005, the ICFTU, ETUC and WCL have written to European 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, and many of their affiliates have written to the countries in 
the European Union committee that decides which countries will benefit under their GSP. These 
bodies urged the EU to suspend GSP due to the violation of trade union rights in Belarus. The EU 
Council adopted a decision to suspend Belarus from the GSP system on 20 December 2006. This 
suspension was enacted on 21 June 2007 after a six month period given to Belarus government to 
comply with the ILO recommendations. 
 
2. Recommendations to the Government of Belarus: Monitoring of Performance 
 
The ILO Commission has parceled violations into twelve recommendations offered for the 
Belarusian government to implement ‘with urgency’. Table 1 contains the list of recommendations 
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(reformulated in a more reader-friendly way) and the degree of their implementation (or non-
implementation) by the authorities. 
 
Table 1: The List of ILO Recommendations and their implementation status 
 
# What it is about What has been done What has to be 
fulfilled 
Conclusion 
1. Registration of primary 
organizations of 
independent trade 
unions 
Only two organizations 
of the REP Union have 
been registered (but 
after the adoption of 
the EU decision) 
Register trade union 
organizations of the 
BCDTU and the REP 
Union; abolish the 
bureaucratic barriers 
to registration 
The least 
respected point, 
much yet to be 
done 
2. Abolish/simplify 
registration procedure 
and related 
membership threshold 
(10% of the labor 
collective) 
A draft of the new Law 
on Trade Unions has 
been developed to 
some extent to 
‘legalize’ discrimination 
against independent 
trade unions 
Abolish address 
requirement and 
registration 
threshold; do not 
revise or adopt a 
independent union-
friendly version of 
the Law 
The government 
has attempted to 
divert attention 
to new law 
instead of 
simplifying 
registration 
3. Non-transparent 
registration principle: 
National Registration 
Commission has to be 
closed 
Commission was closed 
indeed, but its functions 
have been transferred 
to the Ministry of 
Justice 
This point is 
connected to points 
one and two (since 
registration 
requirements 
continue to be strict) 
Formally fulfilled 
4. Publication of the ILO 
recommendations in 
the media 
Published in the 
government newspaper 
‘Respublika’ (and a 
departmental journal) 
 Formally fulfilled 
5. Organizations that 
lodged a complaint 
have to stay immune 
to any persecution 
Persecution has not 
been stopped 
The authorities 
continue to 
pressurize 
independent trade 
union organizations 
and activists and 
prevent them from 
organizing 
Not fulfilled 
6. Directors and 
executives should not 
intervene into trade 
union affairs at the 
enterprise level 
It is unknown whether 
directors were 
instructed about non-
interference, but the 
pressure is still 
observed 
Pressure is still 
exerted at the 
enterprise level by 
using fixed-term 
contracts (and 
threats with a job 
loss) 
Not fulfilled 
7 Anti-union 
discrimination has to 
be stopped 
Fixed-term contracts 
with the activists of 
independent trade 
unions are not 
Activists of 
independent trade 
unions should not be 
persecuted 
Not fulfilled 
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extended 
8 The rule of law has to 
be respected in 
relation to 
independent trade 
unions 
Courts make decisions 
not for the benefit of 
independent trade 
unions 
Courts should stay 
neutral 
Not fulfilled 
9 Make the use of 
foreign aid less 
complicated 
Unions shall not face 
complicated 
bureaucratic 
procedures when 
provided foreign aid 
Procedures remain 
to be complicated; 
foreign aid is very 
hard to obtain 
Not fulfilled 
10 Abolish restrictions on 
mass actions 
Decree No. 11 (on 
mass actions) has been 
abolished 
The Law on Mass 
Actions has not been 
amended; 
independent trade 
unions face legal 
barriers when 
organizing mass 
actions (pickets, 
rallies, etc.) 
Formally fulfilled 
11 Accept BCDTU at the 
National Council for 
Labor and Social Issues 
The BCDTU has been 
provided a place at the 
Council 
 Formally fulfilled 
12 Improve social 
partnership by dividing 
the roles of social 
partners 
The Council on 
Improvement of 
Legislation in Social and 
Labor Fields have been 
created (BCDTU 
representatives are 
allowed to take part in 
its work) 
The Council is a 
consultative body 
with no ability to 
improve the position 
of independent trade 
unions 
Formally fulfilled 
Note: REP = Radio Electronics Workers’ Union; BCDTU = Belarusian Congress of Democratic 
Trade Unions; FTUB = Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus 
 
Out of twelve points formulated by the ILO, it is possible to distil three key aspects that are at the 
heart of the problem. The first is the issue of the registration of primary (enterprise-level) 
organizations of independent trade unions. The most rigid barrier they currently face is the 
requirement to obtain a legal address in order to be formally registered (and thus conduct 
collective bargaining). Te ILO pressure played a role since two organizations of the REP union 
have been registered right after the meeting in Geneva attended by the representatives of the 
government of Belarus. However, the key message here is to establish a silence-is-consent 
registration principle. 
 
The second aspect is discrimination against independent trade unions. The membership in 
independent trade unions is constrained by discriminatory policies of the authorities. People are 
reluctant to join independent trade unions because they are: (i) scared of loosing a job; and (ii) 
primary organizations are not registered and thus unable to conduct collective bargaining and sign 
up collective agreements. Accordingly, the incentives to join independent trade union organization 
are altered with force. At the same time, there is empirical evidence that potentially membership 
in independent trade unions can increase. The results of the opinion poll conducted by the 
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Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (May 2007) show that ‘free and 
independent unions’ enjoy greater trust of the respondents (42%) than the unions affiliated with 
the FTUB (38.6%). The enterprise-based trade independent union activity may be attractive for 
the employees due to the peculiarities of the labor market in Belarus, as low labor mobility 
increases the stakes of improving welfare at particular enterprise or sector of the.  Accordingly, it 
can be expected that as soon as impediments to the activity of independent trade unions is 
abolished, membership could grow substantially. 
 
The third aspect is the unfair application of fixed-term contracts as a tool to get rid off activists of 
independent trade unions. This measure is particularly sharp, given the problems with finding a 
new job, especially in small localities outside the capital of Belarus, where labor markets tend to 
be dense. It has to be reminded that in the EU countries with some tendencies for ‘flexibilization’ 
of labor markets, fixed-term employment is often considered to be abnormal. 
 
3. Non-Compliance with ILO Recommendations: Domestic Factors 
 
Clearly, it was up to the government of Belarus to make steps towards implementation of the ILO 
recommendations. The key policy action was to register primary organizations of independent 
trade unions. For that purpose, ‘legal address’ requirement had to be abolished. But this measure, 
if implemented, would have had clear political implications. As soon as independent trade union 
organizations start to be registered, the monopoly of the government-sympathetic trade unions 
would be undermined very rapidly. In a broader sense, the removal of legal restrictions on the 
activity of independent trade unions implies the opening of one of the important channels of 
citizens’ activism: something the Belarusian authorities do not want to happen. 
 
In addition, there is an important aspect for the Belarusian authorities such as prestige and image. 
It is somewhat ‘improper’ for the government to be responsive to the demands of a small group 
although these have been channeled through an international body. The straight adoption of the 
recommendations would mean that Belarus is responsive to some external pressure. Such a step, 
as the President of Belarus emphasized many times, is hostile to the very character of his policies.  
 
Moreover, the public relations offensive organized by the official media in Belarus regarding the 
GSP suspension was rather effective in undermining the credibility of the EU, the democratic 
opposition, and free trade unions, by portraying it as “sanction-mongerers.” Without efficient 
channels of communications with the Belarusian public and a chance to explain the essence of the 
demands and what is at stake for the Belarusian society, the conditionality policy was doomed to 
such PR failure. This being said, this failure cannot be solely blamed on the EU. In fact, building of 
such communications channels is a primary task of the Belarusian civil society, which, being poorly 
organized and not efficient, by and large failed to engage with the Belarusian public and seem place 
unwarranted hope that the job of advancing political and economic change in Belarus could be 
done by a combination of the external pressure and the economic calamity. 
 
 
4. GSP Conditionality in the Context of Belarus-EU Relations 
 
The issue of withdrawal from the GSP should be perceived in the context of the overall relations 
between the EU and Belarus. While Belarusian economy heavily depends on the exports of 
processed oil to the EU, the GSP suspension affected oil exports in an extremely marginal way, as 
the BISS estimates suggested. This means, it did not diminish in any way the ability to the 
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Belarusian government to maintain political control and the economic stability, including generous 
welfare policies, inside the country.   
 
This being said, the attempt by the EU to influence domestic political developments in Belarus 
using the GSP mechanism was not entirely unsuccessful. One positive development that came up 
out of the process the building of the communication channels between the Union and those of 
the Belarusian elites that understand that improvement of the EU-Belarus relations will be 
necessary sooner or later, especially against the background of the nearly absent communication 
between Belarus and the EU in the past decade. Also, the bargaining surrounding the GSP allowed 
for some liberalization of political climate in Belarus and the release of some political prisoners, 
although these developments were short-lived and largely reversed. Last but not least, it is in the 
middle of this process (although not directly related to it) that the EU attempted for the first time 
ever to appeal directly to the Belarusian people, extending the offer of cooperation and 
partnership. Regardless of the short-term effectiveness of this message, it is a positive sign that 
gives hope for a more energetic EU involvement into the Belarusian affairs in the future.  
 
Yet, it has to be understood that the official Minsk became somewhat responsive to the EU 
leverage only  at the moment of uncertainty, when the Belarusian authorities could not have 
calculated the consequences of the oil and gas price hikes following the Belarus-Russia “energy 
conflict”  last winter. The official Minsk sent some signals about its readiness to mend bridges with 
the EU, not just in order to avoid direct losses from the GSP suspension, but, in a broader sense, 
to explore other ways of ensuring the economic stability in Belarus once Russia’s subsidies were 
no longer guaranteed.  
 
 This period of uncertainty, however, was soon over as soon the Belarusian authorities found 
other, at least short term, alternatives to economic liberalization and opening up to the West, 
such as external borrowing. With GSP suspension (as well as travel bans and asset freezes) already 
in place, the EU ran out of the sanctions it could exert on Belarus without damaging its own 
economic interests, the democratic opposition inside the country, and, for its reason, its overall 
democratization objectives vis-à-vis Belarus.  
 
 
5. Ways to Revise Policy 
 
Two important conclusions can be derived from the “GSP affair.” For the democratic opposition 
in Belarus, a simple conclusion is that it still cannot count on the external pressure to have all its 
problems within Belarus solved. Even much heavier economic strike that was blown to Belarus by 
the increase of oil and gas prices by Russia has yet to generate a push towards a full-scale 
transformation in Belarus. It would have been naïve and short-sighted to count on the EU or 
international organizations in this role with much more limited tools of leverage they possess.  
 
For the EU, the GSP story once again confirmed that the policy of half-hearted measures and 
“wait-and-see” approach towards the official Minsk brings only limited, if any, results.  While there 
is no shortage of declarations on behalf of the EU institutions about their desire to see Belarus as 
a democratic and responsible partner,  this ambitious goal can only be achieved with a more 
energetic and proactive policy than the one that  had been pursued so far. This being said, we do 
not call for the revision of the key elements of the EU policy towards Belarus (conditionality, a 
pursuit of a critical dialogue, and a positive message to the Belarusian public) but rather for the 
radical extension and deepening of this policy. 
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Such policy needs a strategic vision of Belarus’ development in the future. The incentives offered 
by the EU  to Belarus to engage in reform  may be weak and rather unspecific now, but may 
become effective in a more distant future, in the case when the politico-economic model currently 
existing in Belarus will no longer be sustained. In this case, the EU may indeed come up as an 
important player capable of influencing the political and economic direction in the country. It is 
important to start planning in advance for this scenario in three important ways.  
 
The first is to decipher the EU message towards Belarus, going beyond general requests of 
democratization and general promises of bright future of cooperation and partnership in a better 
world, but laying down a benchmarking approach that would specify what concrete action shall 
Belarus make in order to make an engagement with the Union possible and productive in a given 
arena (be it trade, political cooperation, etc.) Such a benchmarking approach would present a 
“roadmap” for political and economic change to which the Belarusian elites, and set an agenda for 
the upward pressure towards the Belarusian government for reform. Another value of such a 
roadmap is to present an exit strategy for the Belarusian elites and thus to increase their 
motivation to accept and promote the change and reform. 
 
The second is to develop communications with those parts of the Belarusian society and the elites 
that are or will be responsive to this EU message. Perhaps, energy dialogue will be the most 
important and pivotal area in which such communication channels can be built, considering the 
strategic importance of the energy issue for both political and economic future of Belarus, and for 
the EU-Belarus relations. Such dialogue, in which lower-level officials and governments can be 
involved together with representatives of civil society and the independent expert community in 
Belarus, is the best available way to promote a positive image of the EU inside Belarus.  
 
The third is to build communication channels with the Belarusian society through which the 
Belarusian public could be able to receive the EU messages and understand its policies. It is a very 
heavy channel given the semi-closed nature of the Belarusian political system as it exists today. But 
some measures, such as the development of efficient media projects, activization of cultural, 
educational, and professional exchanges, and relaxation of travel requirements for Belarusians, 
especially the younger generation, may help immensely.  
 
Overall, the major way to revise the EU policy towards Belarus is, while keeping the current 
conditionality policy in place, to go beyond it and to invest into the formation of social agency 
inside Belarus that could enhance the bottom-up pressure for the political and economic change 
and, moreover, will be capable of bringing this change to reality. We understand that such 
proactive strategy to the EU’s long-standing tradition of government-to-government cooperation 
and conditionality in relations with neighbors and partners, which is based on the presumption 
that it is up to a partner to make the first step and prove that there is some basis for engagement. 
Yet, the decade of unsuccessful application of this approach to Belarus itself presents a convincing 
case for upgrading this approach.  
 
 
 
   
 
